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The eminent Roman jurist Labeo describes the contract of
Roman law as being ultrocitroque obligatio quod Graeci synal-
lagma vocant. In conjunction herewith it is helpful to consult a
passage from Justinian's Digest of which a translation is as fol-
lows: "If there is a causa then, according to Ariosto's well-
expressed reply to Celsus, there is an obligation formed. For
example, I have given you a thing on the understanding that you
should give me another, or I have given you something that you
should do something . , this, says Ariosto, amounts to a
synallagma, i. e. a contract, and a civil obligation arises from it." 2
The characteristic feature of a contract was thus that an obliga-
tion to do or to give something was called into being on the part
of each of the parties to the contract. An obligation on one side
implies a corresponding right on the other side, and thus mutual
rights as well as mutual obligations were created. The feature
of mutuality was that which distinguished a contract from a do-
nation for, of course, in the case of the latter no obligation of any
sort ensued on the part of at least the donee.
It has sometimes been thought and said that in Roman law no
consideration was required for the validity of a contract. It is
difficult to conceive how such an idea could ever have arisen in
the face of Labeo's language cited above. For with the necessity
of mutuality of performance the promised or executed perform-
ance by way of giving or doing on the one side was the required
consideration for the giving or doing on the other side. Mutual
performance, promised or accomplished, on the one side, was
thus what created the validity of an agreement as a contract; the
valid contract again created obligation. A contract may thus
be described in terms of either its origin or its effect. It may
thus be regarded either as an agreement of parties which is sup-
ported by a giving or doing on either side or as an agreement of
parties from which ensues an obligation of giving or doing on
either side. English lawyers, as a rule, deal with the matter
of contract in the former aspect; Labeo deals with it in the latter
aspect. Labeo's treatment of the matter appears to be the pref-
erable one, for it avoids departure from correct principle more
effectively than the other method of dealing with the matter does.
The several titles of Justinian's Digest treating of causa show,
however, that this other method had not been lost sight of. For
I Digest, 50. 16. 19.
2 Digest, 2. 14. 7, sec. 2.
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cavuac is that which has been promised to be given or done or has
been given or done (causa data) by a party to an agreement with
a view to something being given or done by the other party.
Causa in its essential features was thus but the English coaaid-
eration.
It is interesting to note certain differences in the application
of the principle of causa or consideration between Roman and
English law. A gratuitous promise by one person to lend an
article to another for a certain time was as little a valid contract
in Roman as in English law, for the other incurred no obligation
in consequence of such a promise, and consequently there was no
mutuality of performance. But as soon as delivery had been
made of the promised article and the promisor had thus divested
himself of the possession of the article an obligation arose on the
part of the other to deliver the article back at the appointed time.
The right of the lender to claim back the article at such time after
he had once divested himself of its possession was of beneficial
interest to him. It is apparent thus that with the delivery of
the article by the lender mutual rights and obligations ensued, as
required by Labeo. This condition of things is apparently lost
sight of by English lawyers, according to whom the article could
be claimed back at any time by the lender. In point of correct-
ness of principle and also of equity it would seem that preference
must be given to the practical application of the principle enun-
ciated by Labeo in comparison with the practical application of
the principle of consideration in English law.
The main difficulty in connection with Labeo's description of
contract has been the contract of mandatum. But regarding the
matter from a historical point of view it seems probable that
originally the subject of a contract of this rind was always a
tangible article and that delivery of the article was contempo-
raneous with the inception of the contract, as in the case of the
lending of an article by one person to another. This seems to
be implied by the word nzandatum itself, which is derived from
manus and dare. A mere promise to accept a manzdatum was
not binding just as a mere promise to lend was ineffective, but the
2nandatum having been accepted, as in the case of a thing lent
for use, the contract was binding on both sides and consequently
the mandatory became liable not only for malfeasance but also
for nonfeasance. In course of time it became possible, and per-
haps usual, to allow the mandatory a fee or reward of some sort
without the transaction becoming the less honorific contract of
hiring of services.
The principle of consideration was carried further in Roman
than in English law. Thus with the application of the principle
of laesio e normis a contract of purchase and sale was voidable
where the price given was inadequate. There are post-Roman
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commentators who hold that the principle of laesio enormis was
in Roman law applicable also to all other contracts besides that
of purchase and sale, excepting that of compromise of suit (trans-
actio). By an obligation was of course meant a real and substan-
tial one, so that a "peppercorn consideration" would certainly
not have been held sufficient to sustain the validity of a contract.
Also, even without a special agreement an obligation could
arise quasi ex contractu, where, for instance, expenses had been
incurred by a person on behalf of another without special author-
ization by the other under circumstances which rendered it equit-
able that his expenses should be recouped to him. In general the
principle applicable to the various transactions of mankind apart
from donation was: bono et aequo non conveniat . . . lu-
crari aliquem cum damno alterius aut damnum sentire per al-
terius lucrum3
As an example of the practical application of the principle of
consideration in the Roman law of contract the following case,
taken from Justinian's Digest may be given. Where an agree-
ment was entered into between the owner of a fugitive slave and
another person by which the owner was to pay the other a cer-
tain amount should the other capture and deliver to the owner
the fugitive slave, this agreement was declared to constitute a
valid contract for the. reason assigned that it comprised a bargain
of some sort (habet in se negotium aliquod) .4 The bargain thus,
involving a quid pro quo, was the determining factor in the agree-
ment establishing obligation.
An interesting case illustrative of the meaning of the word
causa, in the Roman law of contract is that of compromise of suit
(transactio). There the concrete advantage which each of the
parties to the contract enjoyed was that each was thereby freed
from the danger and trouble of litigation. Si lis fuit, hoc ipsum,
quod a lite disceditur, causa videtur esse.5 Of course if there
was a genuine dispute each of the parties surrendered some por-
tion of that to which he conceived himself to be entitled. Trans-
actio nubo dato, vet 'retento, seu promisso minime procedit.0  It
is this that distinguished the contract from a donation. Qui
transigit re dubia et lite incerta, . . . transigit. Qui vero
paciscitur donationis causa rem certam et indubitatam liberali-
tate remittitJ An instance of the liberality here referred to is
where a person enters into an agreement with another to forego
a portion of an acknowledged claim against the other, and such
3 Digest, 23. 3. 6, sec. 2.
4 Digest, 19. 5. 15. The word negotium is frequently used in the Digook
in the sense of a permutative agreement.
G Digest, 12. 6. 65, sec. 1.
6 Code, 2. 4. 38.
7 Digest, 2. 15. 1. Causa in the ablative here is used in a sense different
from that in which the word is used as signifying consideration.
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an agreement was perfectly valid, amounting, as it did, in pait
to a gift, which the other accepted as such.
Labeo's statement affords us a true test by which to judge
whether a certain transaction is a contract or not. Without such
a test it would be difficult to establish a dividing line between what
is a contract and what is not.
